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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
The familiar maxim "hard cases make bad law," or rather, its col-
loquial corruption, "poor cases make bad law," has recently been strik-
ingly exemplified in a decision of the supreme court of Michigan,
holding unconstitutional the statute of that state providing that
"no action or proceeding in any court of record shall be open to objec-
tion on the ground that a merely declaratory judgment, decree, or order
is sought thereby, and the court may make binding declarations of
rights whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed, or not.
" Anway v. Grand Rapids-Ry. (Sept. 30, 1920, Mich.) 179 N.
W. 350.
A statute of Michigan' forbade street railway companies to "require"
motormen and conductors to work more than six days per week, except
in certain emergencies. The plaintiff was a non-union conductor em-
ployed by the company and wished to work more than six days a





week. He therefore brought an action against the company as defend-
ant for a declaration that he was privileged to work more than six
days if both he and the company were willing. A labor union of street
railway employees intervened and contended, that the statute should be
construed to prevent the plaintiff from working more than six days a
week. From a decision in favor of the plaintiff the intervening union
appealed to the supreme court. That court invited the attorney general,
Professor Sunderland, and others to file briefs on the constitutionality
of the declaratory judgment statute. The majority of the court, by
Fellows, J., held that the statute imposed on the court "non-judicial"
functions. The minority, by Sharpe, J., held otherwise, but concluded
that the declaration should not have been granted in the instant case.
At the outset, and in deference to the court, it ought to be said that
the act was tested in an inappropriate case. There was no issue be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant- The issue lay between these
parties on the one hand, and the state or the attorney general on the
other, for the'plaintiff claims that he and the defendant are privileged
to enter into a contract for a seven-day working week and the party in
interest opposed to"this contention i§ not the defendant railway, but
the. state, which by its statute impliedly threatens prosecution of the
parties to such a contract. A'judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendant would obviously have no binding, force upon the
state or its prosecuting officer in a suit for prosecution. When, there-
fore, the court says that the plaintiff has no contract 'with the defend-
ant, claims no breach of any contract, does not allege that the defend-
ant has committed or threatened to commit any wrong upon him, or
that he has any claim, present or prospective, for any damages from
the defendant, it states grounds .why a declaratory judgment might be
refused in this case; but no ground supporting the unconstitutionality
of the declaratory judgment in all cases.
It therefore becomes necessary to examine the grounds upon which
the court reached its conclusion that the power given it to. render
declaratory judgments was non-judicial. The first ground is that the
traditional constitutional separation of powers of government confines
the functions of the court to those judicial in character, and that the
duty of giving advisory opinions is not judicial.
Relying on the unfortunate form in which the plaintiff framed his
prayer for a declaration "as to whether the said defendant [railway
company] may-lawfully permit plaintiff and its other employees who so
.desire to Work more than six days in any one week," and upon the title
of an article, "The Courts as Authorized Legal Advisers of the People,"
the court says, "it at once becomes apparent that by the act the courts
of this state are made the legal advisers of all seeking such advice," and
concludes that this duty is "non-judicial." In a burst of indignation it
adds that the belief "that it is the duty of the state through its courts to
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furnish advice to its citizens" adopts the view that "the state is every-
thing, the individual nothing. Under our government the state does
not till our farms, manufacture our automobiles, conduct our great
department stores, or do our law business for us. The unfortunate
people of one country are at present trying such experiment in govern-
ment."
It is regrettable that the declaratory judgment, used so effectively in
England, Scotland, and the British dominions and in continental Europe
to prevent and allay disturbances of the legal equilibrium, should have
produced such judicial irritation in an American court. It will be a
matter of surprise to the judges of the British Empire, who are as
familiar with the limitations upon "judicial power" as the courts of the
United States,2 that any court should have questioned that the render-
ing of declaratory judgments was anything but the exercise of judicial
power. Indeed, the only explanation for the conclusion reached by the
Michigan court in the instant case is that the majority completely
ignored the distinction between the advisory opinion and the declaratory
judgment, which in principle are utterly different, and permitted the
resulting confusion to mislead them. This is the more inexcusable,
in that at least Professor Sunderland's brief makes the distinction un-
mistakably clear, and in that the minority opinion, which may be
quoted, points out the majority's confusion of ideas. Judge Sharpe
says:
"Herein lies the distinction between declaratory judgments and moot
cases or advisory opinions. The declaratory judgment is a final- one,
forever binding on the parties on the issues presented; the decision of a
moot case is mere dictum, as no rights are affected thereby; while an
advisory opinion is but an expression of the law as applied to certain
facts not necessarily in dispute and can have no binding effect on any
future litigation between interested persons."
The apparent failure of the majority to understand that a declaratory
judgment is as final and binding upon the parties and as conclusive
upon their legal relations as any other judgment and differs from the
ordinary judgment only in dispensing with a coercive decree, e. g. for
damages or an injunction, accounts for the quotation of pages of
alleged precedents and dicta denying the power of American courts to
render advisory opinions or decide moot cases, which, I submit, have
"nothing to do with the case," and for the expression of opinion by the
majority, properly contradicted by the minority, that a judgment of a
court was not "judicial," unless accompanied by a decree enforceable
by process. Even were this latter conclusion correct 8-- and it clearly
'See, for example, Queen v. Local Government Board [19o2] 2 Ir. 349, 373;
Huddart v. Moorehead (i9o8, Australia) 8 Com. L. R. 330, 335, 383.
'The few dicta which intimate that power to make an enforceable decree is
essential to the exercise of -"judicial power," occur in cases where the court
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is not-section 3 of the act under examination enables the successful
party by petition to obtain any further relief required to carry into
compulsory execution the court's determination of the legal relations
of the parties. The declaratory judgment, therefore, while carrying
with it no coercive decree, is as enforceable, through petition for ancil-
lary relief, as any other final judgment.
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court upon which the
court relies to prove the "non-judicial" nature of the declaratory judg-
ment are irrelevant to that point, for they merely establish that the
advisory opinion, the moot case, and the judgment not final or bind-
ing are deemed "non-judicial" in character. They do establish, how-
ever, that the judicial power is properly exercised when the court can
hear and finally determine a controversy according to law.4 Where the
court was able by. its decision to adjudge finally, with binding effect,
the legal relations of the parties before it, no case has been found where
the court has deemed the award of execution or mandatory process es-
sential. Final and effective adjudication, not execution, is the essence
of judicial power. The Supreme Court, therefore, has declined to de-
cide cases where its judgment was not binding on the parties, but was
merely advisory, being subject to revision by Congress or the Execu-
tive. This is the explanation of the Hayburn, 5 Ferreira,6 and Gordon7
cases; to cite them as precedents against the final and binding declara-
tory judgment indicates a failure to make the most obvious and ele-
mentary distinctions. So, likewise, in the Muskrat" case, which the
majority deemed to "put at rest forever this question," contending
parties were not before the court, Congress merely having conferred
power on named individuals to carry a question to the Supreme Court
to determine the constitutionality of certain Acts of Congress. The
parties really affected by the decision had no opportunity as of right to
present their claims to the Court, and, as the Court said, "Such judg-
found that the judgment or opinion it was empowered to render was not final or
binding on the parties, and where for that reason the power was deemed im-
properly conferred.
'See (19o7) 7 CoL. L. REv. 6oi, 6o2. "To adjudicate upon and protect the
rights and interests of individual citizens, and to that end to construe and apply
the law, is the peculiar province of the judicial department." Cooley, Constitu-
tional Limitations (7th ed. 19o3) 132. The court's quotition from Devine v.
Brunswick-Balke Co. (1915) 27o Ill. 504, Iio N. E. 78o, to the effect that judicial
power involves the power "to adjudicate and determine the rights of the parties
to the controversy and to render a judgment or decree which will be effectual
and binding upon them in respect to their personal or property rights in contro-
versy in such proceedings," is unfavorable to the court in the instant case.
(1792, U.-S.) 2 Dal. 4o9. ' (1851, U. S.) 13 How. 40.
(1885) 117 U. S. 697; so also In re.Sanborn (1893) 148 U. S. 222, 13 Sup. Ct.
577. In the Sanborn case it was made abundantly clear that the power to enforce
a judgment by process was not indispensable to its judicial character. It was
deemed enough, in an appropriate case, that a judgment be made "the final and
indisoutable basis of action either by the department or by Congress" (p. 226).
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ment will not conclude private parties, when actual litigation brings to
the Court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation."
The facts that the real parties in interest were not before the Court,
that there was no actual or potential controversy between the parties
appearing, that the judgment was not binding and final, alone suffice
to mark the obvious distinction between the Muskrat case and one
involving the declaratory judgment.
So, likewise, to draw an analogy from "moot cases," which decide
nothing and are without effect even on the parties before the court,
is a fundamental error of the majority. They quote, as if it were an
authority in their favor, from Lorimer v. Wayne Circuit Judge,9 where
the court said,
"The act under which the proceedings were instituted does not pur-
port to make the proceedings of the probate court conclusive upon any-
body. They are not binding even upon the relator."
The court does not seem to realize that this is entirely irrelevant to the
declaratory judgment, which is binding on the parties and is a final de-
termination of their legal relations. That fact also makes the case of
Lloyd v. Wayne Circuit Judge,0 where a proceeding to probate the
will of a living person was held not to result in a binding or final judg-
ment, altogether irrelevant. So, the Evans case," where the court said,
"when the judgment appealed from cannot be affected by the decision
of the appellate court the case becomes a moot one and the appeal
should be dismissed,"
has no bearing on the declaratory judgment.
Equally irrevelant are the numerous dicta and judicial statements to
the effect that the court will not decide abstract questions upon which
no rights depend,'12 or where there is no matter in dispute between
adverse parties, 3 or where the state of facts is merely assumed and
not real.'4 Nor is it a precedent to cite cases, very few in number,
S(1898) 116 Mich. 682, 75 N. W. 133.
(1885) 56 Mich. 236, 23 N. W. 28.
' (19o8) 213 U. S. 297, 29 Sup. Ct. 678. The same criticism applies to the
quotation from California v. San Pablo Ry. (1893) 149 U. S. 308, 13 Sup. Ct. 876,
and Ex parte Steele (igo8, N. D. Ala.) 162 Fed. 694.
1 Hanrahan v. Terminal Station Commission (1912) 2o6 N. Y. 494, ioo N. E.
414; Hamer v. Commonwealth (1907) io7 Va. 636, 59 S. E. 400; Snell V. Welch
(19o3) 28 Mont. 482, 72 Pac. 988; State v. Boughman (1883) 38 Oh. St. 455;
Richardson v. McChesney (292o) z8 U. S. 487, 31 Sup. Ct. 43; Williams v.
Hagood (1879) 98 U. S. 72.
"Sennette et al. v. Police Jury (IgII) 129 La. 728, 56 So. 653; Lonergan v.
Goodman (igio) 241 Ill. 2oo, 89 N. E. 349; Ward v. Alsup (1898) IOO Tenn. 62o,
46 S. W. 573.
" Wahl v. Brewer (1894) 8o Md. 237, 30 Atl. 654; Smith v. Cudworth (1883,
Mass.) 24 Pick. 196; Judson v. Flushing Jockey Club (895, C. P.) 24 Misc. 350,
36 N. Y. Supp. 126.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
where the courts have declined to enter declaratory decrees in the
absence of statutory power to do so.15
The majority, on the other hand, dismisses from consideration the
many types of cases in which courts now render declaratory judgments
carrying no mandatory process. Judgments removing clouds from title
and quieting title are cast aside as "not persuasive"; judgments deter-
mining title to property real and personal, declaring marriages void,
determining heirs without an order of distribution, construing wills and
other written instruments, confirming the validity of municipal bond
issues,'6 the binding judgments of the Court of Claims as to amounts
due-to mention but a few-all of which carry no mandatory process
for execution, were cited to the court and dismissed as not "convincing
to our minds." The English practice in rendering declaratory judg-
ments, which has proved by long experience so valuable to private par-
ties, is dismissed as a precedent by the assertion that England has no
written constitution and that the courts are bound by Acts of Parlia-
ment. But when it is recalled that England has for at least two cen-
turies been familiar with the doctrine of separation of powers and that
the existing provision for declaratory judgments was adopted by the
courts themselves under their rule-making authority and not imposed
on them by Act of Parliament, the validity of the Michigan court's
argument is weakened. No English court, nor probably any other but
this court, could possibly conceive that a declaratory judgment was not
the exercise of "judicial power." The fact that Canada, Australia, New
Jersey, and Connecticut render declaratory judgments under written
constitutions providing for separation of powers, is not taken into con-
sideration, except that the court says of the later New Jersey cases,
which of course did not question the constitutionality of the declara-
tory judgment, that they have not "treated the constitutional question
or determined that the act was valid."
It is unnecessary to cite those many functions performed by courts
under legislative authority and more or less remote from the province
of adjudging the legal relations of parties before it,17 to conclude that
the declaratory judgment settling "for all time the rights of the parties
in the matter presented"' 8 is strictly within the "judicial power," and
that the majority, by failing to understand the character and effect of a
declaratory judgment, have misread and misconstrued the decisions and
" Hanson v. Griswold (igI) 221 Mass. 228, io8 N. E. 1035; Greeley v. Nashua
(1886) 62 N. H. 166.
This conclusion is not affected by the dictum of Brewer, J., in Trega v.
Modesto Irrigation District (1896) 164 U. S. 179, 17 Sup. -Ct. 52, relied upon by
the court.
"See the article by W. W. Thornton in (i9o8) 66 Cent. L. J. 24; Metz v.
Maddox (Igo7) 121 App. Div. 147, 1$5 N. Y. Supp. 702, and notes in (1907) 21
HARv. L. REv. 138 and (1907) 7 CoL. L. REv. 6oi.
' This was the test applied by Sharpe, J., in his dissenting opinion.
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opinions from which they quote in support of their conclusion that the
declaratory judgment is unconstitutional. The unfortunate effect of the
decision is evident by the fact that in the very next case submitted to the
Michigan court, involving contested claims of parties under a written
lease and hence most appropriate for a declaratory judgment, the
declaration sought was denied on the ground that the act authorizing
such judgments had been held unconstitutional. It is .to be hoped that
in the light of further consideration of the subject the court will be
persuaded to open the question to argument in another case; if it does,
it is'hardly to be doubted that a different conclusion will be reached.
E. M. B.
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN AS BENEFICIARIES UNDER WRONGFUL DEATH
ACTS.
The recent case of Washington, B. & A. Ry. v. State (192o, Md.)
III Ad. 164, again raises the question as to the exact relationship be-
tween an illegitimate child and its mother, a wrongful death Act
being involved on this occasion. By the Maryland statute, which
is almost the same as Lord Campbell's Act, an action may be maintained
by the state for the "benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and child of
the person whose death shall have been caused," the jury to give such
damages as they may think .proportionate to the injury resulting from
such death, to the parties for whose benefit such action is brought. In
this case, an action was brought for the death of a woman, one of the
beneficiaries being her illegitimate child. It being necessary to decide,
in order to ascertain the relevancy of certain evidence, whether an
illegitimate child could recover under the Maryland statute, the court
held that an illegitimate child could not recover, as the word "child,"
when used in a statute, prima facie means legitimate child.
2
The rule adopted by the courts, in construing the word "child" in a
statute to mean legitimate child, seems to have no legal or logical basis.
At common law, the rule that a bastard was nullius filius applied to
cases of inheritance,3 but the ties of nature were binding for many
other purposes.4 When the word "child" is used in an inheritance
statute giving certain rights to children, there is reasonable ground for
holding that the statute does not confer any rights on an illegitimate
child, as under the common law an illegitimate child has no inheritable
blood. But when the word "child" is used in a statute which in no way
relates to inheritance, this reasoning is not applicable.
'Ann. Code Laws of Md. (I911) art. 67.
'5 Am. & Eng. Encyc. (2d ed. igoo) 1o95; 7 C. J. 959.
32 Kent, Commentaries (3th ed. 1884) 277; 1 Coke, Littleton (ist Am. ed.
1853) sec. 188; 1 Coke, Law of England (2d Am. ed. 1836) zi6, note F.
'2 Kent, Commentaries (13th ed. 1884) 277.
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In saying that the rule of construction which it follows is a prima
facie rule of construction, the court is impliedly asserting that if there
were any indication that the legislature intended to include an illegi-
timate child within the provisions of the statute, it would construe the
word "child' to include an illegitimate child. As an illustration, sup-
pose that a state statute provides that children of the same parent cannot
intermarry. Would the statute operate so as to prevent illegitimate
children of the same parent from intermarrying? If the purpose of the
legislature, in enacting the statute, was to prevent the birth of deformed
offspring or imbeciles, there is no doubt that the prima facie rule of
construction would not be applied, since such a purpose would thereby
be defeated. The further fact that at common law it was held unlaw-
ful for a bastard to marry within the Levitical degrees,5 would be
considered as an indication that the legislature intended to include ille-
gitimate children within the provisions of the statute. What the court
is in fact saying in the principal case, then, is that the legislature, by
naming "child" as beneficiary, intended to exclude an illegitimate child
from its provisions.
It seems that there is no good reason of logic or policy to attribute
such an intention to the legislature. The preamble to Lord Campbell's
Act,6 which the Maryland statute closely follows, states the act to be
one for compensating the families of persons killed by accident. The
purpose of the statute is to provide a money substitute for the benefits
which the beneficiary could have reasonably expected from the continued
life of the deceased. 7 If a mother owes certain duties to her illegiti-
mate child which the law recognizes as arising from the blood relation-
ship,. can it be said, when the child is deprived of these rights through
the death of its mother, that such a child was not intended to be in-
cluded as a beneficiary under the statute?
There was doubt in England, whether a mother was under a com-
mon-law duty to support her bastard child.' By the Poor Laws,9 how-
ever, such a duty was imposed on her. In this country, even in the
absence of statute, it has been held that a mother, as the natural guard-
ian of the child, is under a duty to support it.1° Since the child has a
right to support from its mother, there seems to be no principle of
public policy or justice upon which the court can base its refusal to
'Hains v. Jeffel (1695) I Ld. Raym. 68.
39 & io Vict. (1846) c. 93.
717 C. J. I318, sec. i88, id. 1328, sec. i99; Tiffany, Death by Wrongful Act
(2d ed. 1913) sec. 153; cf. Ormsbee v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. (1917) 197
Mich. 576, 164 N. W. 4o8; Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Beale (I92O, Ga.) ,o3
S. E. 434.
8 See Humphrys v. Polak & Wife ['igol] 2 K. B. 385, 389.
'4 & 5 Wm. IV (1834) c. 76, sec. 71.
" Nine v. Starr (1879) 8 Ore. 49; 2 Kent, Commentaries (I3th ed. 1884) 278,
279; see also cases cited in (192o) 15 ILL. L. REv. 215.
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let such a child recover. There appears to be but one reason for the
court's interpretation of the act, and that is, that by excluding an
illegitimate child from the provisions of the act, illicit commerce be-
tween the sexes would be discouraged. It is obvious, however, that this
remedy will not be particularly effective.
The fact that practically all of our states allow an illegitimate
child to inherit from its mother is a further argument for allowing an
illegitimate child to recover for her death. Kent says,
11 that this
"rests upon the principle that the relation of parent and child, which
exists in this unhappy case in all its native and binding force, ought to
produce the ordinary legal consequences of that consanguinity."
It is true that these statutes do not legitimate bastard children, but the
effect is to remove practically the only common-law disability of an
illegitimate child with respect to its mother.'2 Having clothed illegiti-
mate children with the relationship and attributes of legitimate children,
by allowing them to inherit from their mother,1 3 it is believed that the
legislature intended, by the use of the word "child" in the Wrongful
Death Act, to include illegitimate children as parties entitled to be bene-
ficiaries of the action, in so far as they claim with reference to their
mother. Legislation reflects the mores of the times, and to interpret a
statute so as to make it retrogressive, is to defeat the purpose of legis-
lation.
The decision in the principal case seems also to be against the weight
of authority, as represented by two cases which are analogous. In
Quinones v. American Ry. of Porto Rico'4 two illegitimate children
brought an action for the death of their father under the Employer's
Liability Act, which named "children" as beneficiaries. The father
under Porto Rican law was under a duty to support and educate his
bastard children, and the court held that it would be too narrow to hold
that the word "children," in the statute, did not include illegitimate chil-
dren.'5  In Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. v. Walker,'6 where two illegiti-
2 Kent, Commentaries (I3th ed. x884) 277.
Smith v. Garber (1918) 286 Ill. 67, 121 N. E. 173.
"Ann. Code Laws of Md. (1911) art. 46, sec. 3o.
14 (i9o8) 4 Porto Rico Fed. 254.
The only case that comes near to being an authority against Quinones v.
American Ry. of Porto Rico, supra, is the decision in Good v. Touns & Sullivan
(1883) 56 Vt. 410, where an illegitimate child, actually dependent on its father,
brought an action under a statute giving a right of action to one dependent on a
person, whose death was caused by intoxication .from the use of liquor unlawfully
sold. The court held that "dependent," as used in the statute, meant a legal
dependency, and as a father was not under a legal duty to support his illegitimate
child, then the plaintiff could not recover. This case, however, is no authority
for refusing a recovery where the parent is under a legal duty to support his
bastard child. In Roberts v. Wlialey (1916) 192 Mich. 133, 158 N. W. 2og, ille-
gitimate children, living with their father, brought an action for his death under
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mate children sued for the death of their mother, the court held that
in view of the fact that illegitimate children could inherit from their
mother, and that a mother was under a duty to support her illegitimate
children, the legislature intended to include illegitimate children within
the provisions of the statute, and they were allowed to recover. The
.many cases which hold that a mother cannot recover for the death of
her illegitimate child.1 7 even in jurisdictions where a mother and her
illegitimate child can inherit from each other, do not seem to be author-
ity for refusing an illegitimate child a recovery for the death of its
mother. To let an immoral parent recover, would resemble a case of
letting one profit from his own wrong, but to refuse an illegitimate
child a recovery, would be punishing it for a wrong for which it was
in no way responsible. Public policy demands a liberal construction
of the word "child" when an innocent child is the plaintiff, both to pro-
tect the child and to prevent it from becoming a public charge. Cases
allowing a mother to recover for the death of her illegitimate child 8
are authority, of course, for letting an illegitimate child recover for the
death of its mother.
The principal case is the first to refuse to an illegitimate child a re-
covery for the death of its mother. In view of the authorities and
some recent legislation, 9 there is little doubt that the courts would
hesitate to follow this interpretation.
the Workmen's Compensation Act, which named "dependents" as beneficiaries.
The court held that the deceased was under a legal and moral duty to support his
illegitimate children and that they were clearly within the meaning of the statute.
See also (qIg9) 28 YAiz LAw JoumxAL, 518. It may also be observed that the
principal case is much stronger than that of Quinones v. American Ry. of Porto
Rico, supra. There, illegitimate children recovered for the death of their father,
while in the principal case an illegitimate child sought to recover for the death
of its mother.
1 (i97) 48 Tex. Civ. App. 52, io6 S. W. 705.
'
1Harkins v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. (1881, Pa. C. P.) 15 Phila. 286;
Robinson v. Georgia Ry. & Banking Co. (19o3) 117 Ga. 168, 43 S E. 452; Lynch
v. Knoop (19o7) 118 La. 611, 43 So. 252; McDonald v. Southern Ry. (19o4)
7, S. C. 352, 51 S. E. 138.
"
1Marshall v. Wabash Ry. (1894) 120 Mo. 275, 25 S. W. 179; Andrzejewski v.
Northwestern Fuel Co. (1914) i58 Wis. I70, 148 N. W. 37; Hadley v. City of
Tallahassee (1914) 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545, Ann. Cas. 1916 C, 719, note.
"The trend of the law on the subject, as well as the probable intent of the
legislature, may be illustrated by examining the decisions arid legislative enact-
ments in the state of South Carolina. In McDonald v. Southern Ry., supra,
decided in 19o4, the court refused to let a mother recover for the death of her
illegitimate child. In 19o6, the legislature passed an act stating that in the event
of the death of such illegitimate child, or the mother of an illegitimate child, by
the wrongful act of another, the mother, or the illegitimate child, should have the
same rights and remedies as though such illegitimate child had been born in
lawful wedlock. Croft v. Southern Cotton Oil Co. (iog) 83 S. C. 232, 65 S. E.
216, allowed a mother to recover for the death of her illegitimate child.
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EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER FOR AESTHETIC PURPOSES.
The proper limitation to place upon the police power is a question
that st ill puzzles the courts. In two recent cases, Ingham v. Brooks
(192o, Conn.) III Ati. 2g9, and Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg.
Corp. (1920) 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209, courts took different views
regarding building restrictions. In the Connecticut case a borough
ordinance forbidding the erection of any building unless a written per-
mit was issued by the warden and burgesses was held unreasonable.
In the New York case the court declared constitutional a statute
amending the charter of NTew York City, which empowered the board
of estimate to pass resolutions creating building zones.
The police power is designed to promote the public welfare by re-
straints and compulsion.' When rights in private property are in-
vaded, the courts have held that the basis of the proper exercise of this
power must be to promote the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare. 2 The police power contemplates the destruction of the par-
ticular right or privilege legislated against, while under the power of
eminent domain that right is transferred to the public use;3 that is, the
rights are extinguished in the individual and re-created in the public.
When a particular right, or more accurately privilege, cannot.be en-
joyed by an individual without injury to the public, it is most certain
that its transfer to a public use cannot change its harmful character.
And hence the prohibition of the use is an exercise of the police power,
and not a taking under the power of eminent domain. The abatement
of a nuisance is an obvious example. The distinction seems a .fine one
to draw, but it exists.4 Can it be said that the establishment of a build-
ing line results in the taking of private property for a public use? The
privilege of building upon the land between the line and the street has
ceased to exist; the public cannot build there without defeating the very
purpose that could give legality to the act establishing the line.5 Such
'Freund, Police Power (19o4) sec. 3; Tiedeman, Limitations on Police Power
(i886) sec. I.
'Eubank v. City of Richmond (1912) 226 U. S. 137, 33 Sup. Ct. 76.
'Freund, Police Power (i9o4) secs. 511, 512; I Nichols, Eminent Domain
(1917) sec. 54.
'See I Lewis, Eminent Donain (3d ed. igog) sec. I. This author defines the
power of eminent domain as "the power to take private property for the public
welfare." See NoTEs (9:2o) 2o CoL. L. REv. 591, 592.
' Such a taking would fall under Mr. Lewis's definition as a taking for the
public welfare. But is this taking really an exercise of the power of eminent
domain? For the rights and privileges taken cease 'to exist and are not trans-
ferred to the public. In St. Louis v. Hill (1893) i16 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861 the
court held that the establishment of a building line constituted a "taking" of the
property without compensation. Taking, when used in the sense of a taking
under the power of eminent domain, connotes the transfer of some privileges in
the land to the public.
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a distinction seems sound and necessary in order to understand the
decisions, for it is under one of these powers that the ordinances in
the principal cases must be sustained.
The police power can be properly exercised only in a reasonable man-
ner, without improper discriminations, and without denying due process
of law. When municipal corporations have attempted its exercise for
apparently "aesthetic" purposes, the courts have refused to recognize
their acts as valid.6 Ordinances restricting such buildings as livery
stables,7 garages,8 laundries,9 junk-shops, 10 brick-yards, 11 undertaking
establishments, 2 and storage-warehouses 3 have furnished abundant
litigation. Courts generally refuse to recognize the validity of building
lines for aesthetic purposes.' 4 In those cases where the ordinances have
been .upheld the courts have often gone a long way to find some threat-
ened injury to public health, safety or morals. Some jurisdictions have
sustained such ordinances under the power of eminent domain and
have provided compensation. 9 Connecticut has made like provision in
the establishment of building lines.' Suh legislation seems based
SQuintini v. Aldermen (1889) 64 Miss. 483, I So. 625 (ordinance requiring a
permit to build in a certain area held invalid).
Curtis v. Los Angeles (1916) 172 Calif. 230, 156 Pac. 462 (invalid) ; Little
Rock v. Reinman-Wolfort (1913) io7 Ark. 174, 155 S. NV. lO5 (vdlid).
'Keller v. Oak Park (1914) 266 Ill. 365, 2O7 N. E. 636 (invalid); Smith v.
Horsford (192o, Kans.) 187 Pac. 685 (invalid); Myers v. Fortunato (192o, Del.)
ilO Atl. 847 (valid). As to whether a garage is a nuisance per se see L. R. A.
1917 E, 369. Some courts consider this and others disregard it as a distinction.
'Ex parte Quong Wo (1911) 161 Calif. 220, 118 Pac. 714 (valid); Watdren
v. First Presbyterian Church (1919, Okla.) 184 Pac. io6 (valid).
" Weadock v. Detroit (19o9) 156 Mich. 376, 12o N. W. 991 (invalid) ; Smolen-
ski v. Chicago (1917) 282 Il1. 131, 118 N. E. 410 (valid).
"
1Denver v. Rogers (19o9) 46 Colo. 479, 1O4 Pac. lO42 (invalid) ; Ex parte
Hadacheck (1913) 165 Calif. 416, 132 Pac. 584 (valid).
'St. Paul v. Kessler (192o, Minn.) 178 N. W. i7I (valid).
Ohio Hair Product Co. v. Rendigs (1918) 98 Oh. St. 251, i2o N. F 836
(valid).
'Farlst Steel Co. v. Bridgeport (i8gi) 6o Conn. 278, 2 Atd. 561; Eubank v.
City of Richmond, supra note 2; St. Louis v. Hill, supra note 5; Welch v. Swasey
(19o6) 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 262, sustained in 214 U. S. 91, 29 Sup. Ct 567.
'
5 Gen. St. Minn., Supp. 1917, secs. 1639-1o to 1639-16. See State v. Houghton
(1916) 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017; see COMMENTS (1916) 26 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 151; State ex rel. Twin City Building Co. v. Houghton (1920, Minn.)
176 N. W. 159; NOTES (1920) 20 COL. L. REv. 591; COMMENTS (1920) I8 MIcH.
L. REV. 523.
16 Conn. Rev. St. 1918, secs. 391-396. The constitutionality of this statute has
not yet been determined. Similar provisions in city charters have been con-
sidered; but the cases seem uniformly to have held the lines invalid for defective
procedure in establishing them, and the constitutional question has been avoided.
See Northrup v. Waterbury (i9o8) 81 Conn. 305, 70 Atl. io24; Hartford v.
Poindexter (2922) 84 Conn. 121, 79 At. 79; Benedict v. Pettes (1912) 85 Conn.
537, 84 At. 332.
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upon the idea that if compensation is provided, all the difficulties are
avoided. But where there is a taking under the power of eminent
domain it must be for a "public use," and there is as much difficulty in
defining this term as the term "public welfare."'-7
Bearing in mind the distinction between the power of eminent domain
and the police power, it is submitted that regulations which have a
tendency or are designed to affect the aesthetic are more properly sus-
tained under the police power. Several states have passed legislation
providing for the establishment of districts or "zones" in the larger
cities.' 8 Massachusetts has made it a matter of constitutional amend-
ment.'9 There is similar legislation in other states directed specifically
against outside advertising.20 Such legislation has generally been
upheld, the courts basing their decisions upon the promotion of the
public welfare. In the case of St. Louis Advertising Co. v. City of St.
Louis," Mr. Justice Holmes, in upholding an ordinance regulating bill-
boards, said, "it is true. . . . that the plaintiff has done away with
dangers from fire and wind, but apart from the question whether those
dangers do not remain sufficient to satisfy the general rule, they are or
may be the least of the objections adverted to in the cases." There is
an intimation that there are other things in mind than the public
health, safety, or morals. The present tendency is to broaden the
scope of the police power and to use it to accomplish aesthetic purposes
wherever in sound public policy there is reason to do so.
The apparently opposed decisions in the two principal cases may
possibly be reconciled. In the Connecticut case, the court declared
that the ordinance was unreasonable, because it gave discretionary
powers to the officer who acted under it, and made no uniform rule for
"Bunyan v. Palisade Park Commissioners (1915) 167 App. Div. 457, 153 N. Y.
Supp. 622; Parker v. Williams (19o2) 188 U. S. 491, 23 Sup. Ct. 44o; Farst
Steel Co. v. Bridgeport, supra note 14.
s Calif. Laws of 1917, ch. 734, p. 1419. See Ex parte Quong Wo, supra note 9;
In re Montgomery (1912) 163 Calif. 457, 125 Pac. l070; Ex parte Hadacheck,
supra note ii; Ill. Laws of 1g9 ch. 54, P. 262; 2 Wolff's St. of La. (192o) 1355;
Minn. Laws of 1915 ch. 128, sustained in State ex rel. Twin City Building Co. v.
Houghtont, supra note 15; Neb. L1aws of 1919, ch. 185, p. 417; N. J. Laws of
1917 ch. 54, P. 94; N. Y. Laws of 1916, ch. 497, p. 1320, sustained in Lincoln
Trust Co. v. Williams Bdg. Corp., one of the instant cases.
"Const. of Mass. 6oth Amendment (ii8).
'The Supreme Court of the United States has passed upon bill-board restric-
tions in Cusack v. City of Chicago (1917) 242 U. S. 526, 37 Sup. Ct. 19o, holding
them constitutional. The following states have legislated upon advertising:
Conn. Rev. St. igi, secs. 3024-303o, held constitutional in State v. Murphy (1916)
9o Conn. 662, 98 At. 343; R. I. Laws of 191o, ch. 542, held constitutional in
Gilmartin v. Standish (1917) 40 R. I. 219, ioo Atl. 394; Mass. Laws of "I9O3,
ch. 158, p. 121, held unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Boston Advertising Co.
(i9o5) 188 Mass. 348, 74 N. E. 6oi ; Comp. St. of N. J. 191o, sec. 152, p. 1791, held
unconstitutional in State v. Lamb (1916, N. J.) 98 AtI. 459.
.' (1919) 249 U. S. 269, 274, 39 Sup. Ct. 274-
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his guidance. Under the New York law, the" board of estimate was
likewise given full discretionary powers. Perhaps the public welfare
requires this discretionary power under the conditions existing in a
New York City block, but not with respect to a lone fishing shack on
the Connecticut shore. Even so, the two cases represent opposing
views on discretionary powers.
Since the above comment went to press, the decision of the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court of Errors in the case of Town of Windsor v. Whit-
ney et al. (i92o) II Atl. 354, has been published. In this case the
constitutionality of Rev. St. 1918, secs. 391-395, which provide for the
establishment of building lines by a commission on town plans (see
note i6 supra) was upheld. Justice Wheeler, writing the majority
opinion, sustains the establishment of building lines as a valid exercise
of the police power. His reasoning proceeds upon the basis that all
private property is held subject to regulations that will promote the pub-
lic welfare and that such regulations do not result in a taking of private
property which requires the exercise of the power of eminent domain
and the payment of compensation. It seems hardly necessary to state
that the writer is heartily in accord with these views. The case is an
interesting and proper development of the legal principles involved.
LEGAL PRIVILEGE TO EMPLOY A RUNAWAY SERVANT
It is well settled that the enticement of a servant to commit a breach
of his service contract is a tort giving the master a right to damages.'
The same rule has been laid down in the case of an inducement to com-
mit a breach of a contract, other than that of master and servant, but
as to this there is some conflict.2 There was a long line of cases holding
further that it was a tortious act to harbor and employ the runaway
servant of another with knowledge of the facts, even in the absence of
enticement.3 In the case of adult servants, however, most of these
decisions may be regarded as resting on the Statute of Laborers,4 a
statute passed over 500 years ago in a time of great shortage of labor,
'Lumley v. Gye (1853, Q. B.) 2 E. & B. 216; see 7 Labatt, Master and Servant
(1913) ch. 113.
'Jones v. Stanley (1877) 76 N. C. 355. Cf. Bourlier Bros. v. Macauley (I80I)
91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 6o.
"Blake v. Lanyon (i795, K. B.) 6 T. R. 22I; De Francesco v,. Barnum (1890,
Ch.) 63 L. T. 514 (where the rule was held to apply to the employment contract of
a ballet girl; and Fry, L. J., said that the repeal of the Statute of Laborers made
no difference, in spite of the "very weighty argument of Coleridge, J., in Lumley
v. Gye"), Wilkins & Bros. v. Weaver [1915] 2 Ch. 322. And see i Ames & Smith,
Cases on Torts, 633, note.
S(1349) 23 Edw. III, c. z
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and repealed in 1863. This was the view of Coleridge, J., who dis-
sented in Lumnley v. Gye. For many years there seems to have been
no case in the United States with respect to this tort of harboring,
but it has at last arisen in Shaw v. Fisher (1920, S. C.) 102 S. E. 325.
One Carver was under contract with the plaintiff for one year as a
"share cropper" and voluntarily left the plaintiff's employ in breach of
his contract, saying that he would rather "die and go to hell" than work
longer for the plaintiff. The defendant later employed Carver, with
notice of the foregoing facts, and was sued for damages by the plain-
tiff. It was held that the defendant's act was not a tort, the old tort of
harboring a servant being abolished by the 13 th and i4th Amendments
to the Constitution.
It was the theory of the court that an involuntary servitude would
be created if third parties were forbidden to employ a runaway ser-
vant. "The result would have been to coerce him to perform labor
required by the contract; for he had to work or starve." It may be
admitted that certain types of "peonage" may be an involuntary ser-
vitude within the meaning of the Constitution, but this case is hardly
one of peonage. Perhaps there is such a thing. as "wage slavery," but
under ordinary circumstances, one who has voluntarily contracted to
serve another for pay can scarcely be said to be in involuntary servi-
tude. No one suggests as yet that it is not wrong to break a contract
or that a contract-breaker should not be penalized by a judgment for
damages. In cases where money damages are not adequate, a court
of equity has frequently issued an injunction restraining a contractor
from rendering service for another in breach of his first contract.5
It may be unsound in policy to grant such an injunction, but it seems
not to hav6 been attacked as creating an involuntary servitude. It has
seldom if ever been held that a contract of service will be affirmatively
enforced by mandatory injunction.8
No doubt there are intermediate degrees between slavery and volun-
tary service, some of which may fall within the constitutional prohibi-
tion; but until the federal courts have so decided, the present case should
not rest upon such a ground. The Amendments should not be held to
create a legal privilege to break a service contract, even upon the pay-
ment of damages. The present decision should be sustained upon the
ground that the tort of harboring and employing a runaway adult ser-
vant rested upon the Statute of Laborers, a statute never properly appli-
cable in the United States, and now repealed in England.7 Even if such
'Lumley v. Wagner (1852, Ch.) i D., M., & G. 604; Philadelphia Ball Club v.
Lajoie (19oz) 2o2 Pa. 210, 51 Atl. 973; Cort v. Lassard (1889) 18 Ore. 22r, 22
Pac. io5.
'But cf. Southern Cal. Ry. v. Rutherford (1894, C. C. S. D. Calif.) 62 Fed. 796.
" It is interesting to note that many of the southern states enacted legislation at
the close of the Civil War, making enticement a crime, and that many of them
included the words "knowingly employ" or "knowingly harbor and detain." See
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a tort was recognized by the common law this was due to conditions
long since passed away. It should now be held that the servant has
the legal power of terminating, his primary contract relations with his
employer (except perhaps in cases of irreparable injury) even though
he has not the legal privilege. After definite repudiation by a servant,
other persons should be legally privileged to give him employment.
Surely this is in accord with the general practice and belief of the
community. The instant case really rests upon such modem practice
and belief ; but to many courts it seems easier to torture statutory words
and thus shoulder off the responsibility upon the legislatures for de-
claring that a change in the law has taken place. A. L. C.
PRIVILEGE OF ALIEN ENEMIES TO INHERIT UNDER TREATY
A distinct contribution to the law has recently been made by judge
Cardoio of the New York Court of Appeals in Techt v. Hughes (i92o)
229 N. Y. 222, 128 N. E. 185,1 a decision clearing away much am-
biguous terminology and fallacious reasoning with respect to the
privilege of alien enemies to inherit realty in New York. The decision
involved primarily the construction of the chameleonic term "alien
enemy," which, in spite of many important decisions during the war,
had still been left obscure and doubtful, and an examination of the
extent to which treaty stipulations granting the privilege of inheritance
survive the outbreak of war. Both problems are almost without judi-
cial precedent, and the contributions of writers throw but little helpful
light upon them.
An American-born woman had in 1911 married in the United States
a resident Austrian. On December 7, 1917, war with Austria was
declared, and on December 27, 1917, the woman's father, an American
citizen, died, leaving real property. Another heir contested the priv-
ilege of the woman to inherit, on the ground that she was an alien
enemy, whereas the statute of New York confined this privilege to
"alien friends." The question for decision, therefore, was (I)
whether the American wife of an Austrian subject was during the war
an "alien enemy" or an "alien friend" (the Appellate Division had held
her to be an "alien friend ' 2) and (2) whether, if she was an "alien
enemy," the treaty between the United States and Austria-which con-
tained a stipulation relieving Austrians to some extent from a state
statutory disqualification of inheritance-was still in force at the time
of her father's death, i. e. after the war had broken out.
7 Labatt, Master and Servant (1913) 8067 ff. These are strictly interpreted, how-
ever, and are held not to apply to a case where a man merely gives employment to
a laborer during the unexpired term of a broken contract. Tucker v. State (i9o8)
86 Ark. 436, III S. W. 275.
'Writ of certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court, October 25,
1920.
2 (1gg) 188 App. Div. 743, 177 N. Y. Supp. 42o.
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Judge Cardozo found, first, that the woman was an "alien enemy,"
and not an "alien friend." By her marriage, she acquired the nation-
ality of her husband.3 The historical development of the privileges of
aliens begins from a state of total disability and is marked by gradual
relaxations thereof. In England, these relaxations were first extended
to merchants, and Magna Carta conditions them in time of war upon
reciprocity. Even in time of peace aliens had at common law the priv-
ilege of taking by purchase only (until office found) and not by descent.
4
Whatever privileges of taking by descent the alien may now possess
must therefore be found in statutory or treaty grant. In New York,
the statute of 1913 had extended only to "alien friends" the privilege
of taking by inheritance.5 Reasoning from the cases decided dur-
ing the war in England and the United States permitting peaceable resi-
dent subjects of enemy states to reside unmolested, to sue in municipal
courts, to engage in trade, and to enjoy the ordinary civil rights,6 and
from the fact that the woman had been left unmolested by federal au-
thorities as a law-abiding resident subject of Austria and that "the laws
should be administered" in a spirit in harmony with "the humane and
considerate treatment accorded by this country" to such aliens, the
Appellate Division had found her to be an "alien friend."
This liberal construction Judge Cardozo did not sustain. The priv-
ileges accorded to resident subjects of enemy states, for example, to sue
and to trade, were deemed concessions granted to them not because
they were not "alien enemies," but because the progress of time had
developed a humane relaxation of some of the more severe disabilities
resting upon "alien enemies." They were still "alien enemies," and
subject to restrictions as such. It cannot be urged that because in
treating of "trading with the enemy," the term "alien enemy" has a
wider or different connotation--domicil being made the criterion of
enemy character-that it has not also its original strict meaning of
"subject of the enemy state." It is under this construction, which is
beyond question logical and flawless, that the woman was deemed not to
be an "alien friend" within the meaning of the New York statute.
The alien enemy deriving no aid from the statute, it became neces-
sary to determine whether the treaty with Austria afforded her any
protection. Article 2 of the treaty of 1848 with Austria conferred on
nationals of either contracting party, in case title by descent was not
freely accorded by municipal law, at least title for a limited period of
two years, extendable "according to circumstances," during which the
property could be sold. If article 2 of the treaty could be deemed in
'Act of March 2, 1907,34 Stat. at L. 1228; Mackenzie v. Hare (1915) 239 U. S.
299, 36 Sup. Ct. xo6.
"Martin v. Hunter's Lessee (1816, U. S.) i Wheat. 304.
'Real Property Law, sec. io, as amended by Laws of 1913, ch. 152; Cons. Laws
N. Y., ch. 50.
'See (1917) 27 YALE LAw JOURNAi, 104.
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force after the outbreak of war, the alien could claim the title by inheri-
tance thus conferred.
Confronted with the question whether this provision of the treaty
survived arid could vest the title after the outbreak of war, the court
sought authority. Probably no field of international law is more
elusive in authorities; for the courts have had but few occasions to
pass upon the effect of war on treaties, and the Writers, seeking to find
a rule in the practice of nations, find themselves baffled, by the diverse
action of states, in establishing any criterion or guide for the survival
of treaties, and fall back upon theory and ethics.
Two important decisions, one in the United States and one in Eng-
land,7 have held that where title to real property had vested, under
article 9 of the British-American treaty of 1794, the outbreak of the
war of 1812 did not divest the title, although Judge Story was not sure
that the treaty was not "at most, only suspended," during the war. In
the instant case, the title, if good, vested during the war, so that article
2 of the Austrian treaty must necessarily have remained in full force.
Two schools of thought have developed with respect to the survival
of treaties. Due to a misconception of the distinction between pacta
transitoria or those permanent compacts between states which deal, for
example, with boundaries or other vested rights, and "treaties," in
the narrow sense, which looked to the future and presupposed a state
of peace, it was often said that all "treaties" (now used in the wide
sense to cover all compacts between nations) wer terminated by war.8
While this view, to its full extent, is no longer asserted without qualifi-
cation,9 it being admitted that stipulations relating to boundaries, pub-
lic debts, and war itself must be deemed to remain in force even dur-
ing the war, nevertheless the fact that states frequently in treaties of
peace stipulate the specific pre-war treaties that shall be deemed to
revive or remain in force,10 and the fact that it is difficult in advance of
the peace to make distinctions between abrogation and suspension, have
"Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven (1823, U. S.) 8
Wheat. 464, 494; Sutton v. Sutton (183o, Ch.) i Russ. & M., 663. See also
Carneal v. Banks (1825, U. S.) 1o Wheat. 131 (title acquired under the French
treaty of 1778 not divested by abrogation of that treaty or expiration of the
treaty of 18oo).
' The distinction is carefully preserved by G. F. de Martens in his Pr~cis du droit
des gens (Paris, 1831) cited in Wheaton, International Law (Lawrence's ed. 1863)
460. See 5 Moore, Digest of International Law (19o6) 382-383.
'It was, however, advanced practically without qualification by Secretary of
State Buchanan in 1845 and by President Polk in 1847. Moore, op. cit. 315. Spain
acted upon it by decree at the outbreak of the Spanish-American war, though it
did not fully deprive American citizens of all their treaty rights. See (I898)
FOR. REL. 972-974.10 See, for example, art. 29 of the treaty with'Spain, July 3, 1902, 2 Malloy,
Treaties and Conventions (191o) 171o. The treaty of Versailles reserves to the
Allies the privilege of naming the treaties with Germany which they will deem to
remain in force. Treaty, art. 289.
COMMENTS
induced many writers to support the doctrine that in principal all trea-
ties are abrogated by war, with certain exceptions of treaties looking to
permanent arrangements or the war itself, or treaties to which there
are other parties,1 1 etc. Feeling it incumbent upon thei to state a rule,
and finding no satisfactory criteria and data for a better rule, they con-
tent themselves with announcing this vague formula. Some writers
proceed indeed to name the treaties that they deem necessarily abro-
gated by war, e.g. treaties of commerce and navigation, peace and
friendship, consular conventions, etc., overlooking the fact that the
general name given to the treaty frequently conceals specific articles
having little or no relation to the general title, and easily separable from
other parts of the treaty.12 Thus, in the case of the treaty of 1848 with
Austria, under discussion, article 2 relates to the inheritance of real
property.
The other school adopts the view that treaties in principle remain in
force during hostilities, except such as are incompatible with a state of
war. While this doctine is not yet adopted by many writers, because
it is even more difficult of categorical application than the other view,
it has nevertheless in its support some weighty opinion, including the
authority of Kent and of the Institute of International Law.'
3  In a
country by whose constitution treaties confer rights on private individ-
uals, it is much the better principle to adopt. Its application can be
worked out pragmatically. Until, therefore, the political department of
the government proclaims the termination of treaty stipulations con-
ferring private rights and no injury to the nation resulting, it seems
much preferable to give effect to such stipulations as the law in force.
And the court in the instant case so held.
The concluding paragraph of this notable opinion of Judge Cardozo
warrants quotation:
"No one can study the vague and wavering statements of treatise
and decision in this field of international law with any feeling of assur-
ance at the end that he has chosen the right path. One looks in vain
either for ufliformity of doctrine or for scientific accuracy of exposi-
tion. There are wise cautions for the statesman. There are few pre-
cepts for the judge. All the more, in this uncertainty, I am impelled
to the belief that until the political departments have acted, the courts,
in refusing to give effect to treaties, should limit their refusals to the
needs of the occasion; that they are not bound by any rigid formula
3 Phillimore, International Law (3d ed., i879-1885) 795; 2 Westlake, Inter-
national Law (1904) 29 ff.; 2 Pitt Cobbett, Cases and Opinions on International
Law (3d ed. 1913) 42; I Calvo, Droit International (4th ed. 1887) sec. 362.
"Note in Pitt Cobbett, op. cit. 40. See the views of publicists set out in John
Bassett Moore's valuable article, (i9Oi) i Col. L. REv. 2o0, reprinted in part in
5 Moore, op. cit. supra note 8, at pp. 382-385.
" Kent, Commentaries, 176; (1912) 25 ANNuARE of the Institut de Droit In-
ternationale, 648; Resolutions of the Institute (Carnegie Endowment ed. 19x6)
172; Bluntschli, Das tnoderne V6kerrecht der civilisirten Staten (3d ed. 1878)
sec. 538.
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to nullify the whole or nothing; and that in determining whether this
treaty survived the coming of war, they are free to make choice of the
conclusion which shall seem the most in keeping with the traditions of
the law, the policy of the statutes, the dictates of fair dealing, and the
honor of the nation." E.. M. B.
THE PRIVATE LAW OF CHINA
The first installment of the "Chinese Supreme Court Decisions,",
which have just appeared in an English translation, deserves more than
a passing notice, for they bring to our attention a process of legal devel-
opment which is unique in the history of law. In a preface to the deci-
sions, the President of the Supreme Court characterizes the former
Chinese law as follows:
"In the days of the old r6gime, civil cases were decided more like by
arbitration than by a judicial process; for, except the law of succession
and marriage, there was hardly any law to go by; while in criminal
cases decisions could be based on analogy, and the judge was even
allowed to make punishable an act which in his opinion should not have
been done, though it had not expressly been made an offence by law."
In further explanation of the old state of law, F. T. Cheng, an asso-
ciate justice of the Supreme Court, says :2
"Case law was not unknown in China: it figured prominently in the
late Code; but it related to facts rather than principles and mostly con-
cerned crimes, civil cases being always relegated to the background. The
explanation is simple. The institution of the judicial officer, as distinct
from the administrative, is comparatively a modern idea in China, prob-
ably because there was not so much need for him. Punishment of the
criminal could be accomplished incidentally to the exercise of adminis-
trative functions, while the State took little interest in civil disputes.
The people, too, did not like to go to law, partly, perhaps, because they
had little confidence in the law, which 'to their eyes her ample page
* * . did ne'er unroll,' and partly, perhaps, because they doubted the
advisability of entrusting the settlement of their disputes to men who
were not their peers. Their disputes were often settled in the chapels
or temples in the case of country folks, and in the chambers of com-
merce or guilds in the case of city men. In this respect, paradoxical
though it seems, a sort of 'Government of the people by the people for
the people' existed in monarchical China."
A radical reform was effected towards the end of the Tsing Dynasty
through the reorganization of the Supreme Court, although its actual
work did not really begin until after China had become a Republic.
Without any precedents to go by and with no legislation to guide it,
what could the Supreme Court do to assist in the establishment of gov-
ernment by law and the development of a legal system fit to meet the
needs of the new era and worthy of the confidence of other nations?
'The Chinese Supreme Court Decisions,. Translated by F. T. Cheng. Pub-
lished by the Supreme Court. Peking, Ig2o.
'Decisions, ii.
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Fortunately there were to be found in China jurists, thoroughly
trained in the western systems of law, men of learning, 
of b'road
vision, and of fine courage. These men saw before 
them a won-
derful olportunity for constructive work of the greatest magnitude, 
and
they boldly seized it. They determined not to wait for 
a reform of
Chinese law through legislation, but to go ahead and 
undertake the
task themselves. With this end in view they announced 
the simple but
epoch-making rule that so far as statutes and valid 
customs did not
stand in the way, the Supreme Court would be guided 
in its decisions by
the fundamental principles common to the civilized' 
countries of the
world. The principle is formulated in the Chinese 
Supreme Court
Decisions in the following words :3
"Civil cases are decided first according to express provisions 
of law;
in the absence of express provisions, then, according to customs; and,
in the absence of customs, then according to legal principles."
As the draft of the Civil Code has not yet been promulgated 
and the
customs offer little aid to the courts in the solution of 
the many prob-
lems arising from the new development of the country and 
its new mode
of life, the legal principles referred to constitute practically 
the only
guidance for the court. These principles have been drawn 
from the
continental system of jurisprudence, in regard to which Mr. Cheng
remarks :4
"As to the sources of the principles embodied in this volume 
the
reader will probably find that many of them bear traces of western
jurisprudence. It may, however, be pointed out that those principles of
law which are fundamental to the notion of justice have really no
nationality. They are merely the jus gentium which alone according to
Austin belongs to the legitimate province of jurisprudence, but there
must, of course, be some one first to reduce them to a concrete 
form, just
as the law of gravity had to be discovered by Newton. In 
this sense,
then, it must be admitted that western jurisprudence has been the fruit-
ful field from which these principles have been gathered, and 
indeed
most of our judges have been brought up in western jurisprudence."
By western jurisprudence the learned justice means continental law.
So far as the principles of "civil" law are concerned, no trace of 
Anglo-
American influence can be found. Nor is this surprising, even in 
view
of the fact that some of the Supreme Court judges received their legal
education, in part, at least, in England. The reason for their prefer-
ence of the continental system is not far to seek. The English system
is too complex, too little systematized, and too often the product 
of
mere chance or peculiarities of procedure. It does not 
lend itself
readily to transplantation to a country with a different historical 
back-
ground.
The first part of the decisions deals with "General Principles." This
is after the fashion of the German, Japanese, and Brazilian codes, 
which
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deal in the first book with the principles which may equally apply to
the law of Property, Obligations, Family, or Succession. The most im-portant concept contained in the "General Part," one whose absencein Anglo-American law is often deeply felt, is that of the "juristic act,"in which the central element is the human will. The underlying notionis that a voluntary act shall be given the juristic effect intended by the
actor if it is directed towards a lawful object and is declared in theform prescribed by law, by a person possessing legal capacity.
To what extent the Chinese law will adopt the subjective or objective
theory regarding declarations of will does not fully appear from thedecisions published. In the matter of mistake it lays down the follow-
ing rule :'
"If a mistake as to the tenor of a declaration of intention is suchthat, had the declarant discovered it, he would not have made the declar-
ation of intention, he may rescind it."
This rule adopts the subjective theory in its extreme form. It willbe interesting to see what safe-guards will be provided by the Supreme
Court for the protection of third parties who in good faith dealt with
the party making the mistake.6
The subjective theory is adopted also with respect to duress, which isdefined as "words or actions which are calculated to produce such fearsin the mind of the person threatened or under duress as to make it im-
possible for him to disobey." 7 As regards fraud, a declaration of in-tention can be avoided only if it was made with intent to deceive." Aninnocent misrepresentation does not affect the binding nature of thedeclaration. Whether the party innocently misled will have an actionfor damages upon principles relating to unlawful acts, does not appear.
The English doctrine of consideration finds no favor with the Su-preme Court, which holds that "consideration is not essential to the
validity of the waiver of a right." In the matter of causa it lays down
the following:
"The causa of a juristic act differs from the motive for doing it. Un-
less according to law or to the nature of the act no causa is required,
5Id., part I, 21.
'The German law has adopted the following safeguards: (i) The declaration
can be avoided only if it is not to be supposed that the declarant would not have
made it with full knowledge of the circumstances and with intelligent appreciationof the case. Civil Code, art. iig. (2) The avoidance must be made without
culpable delay after knowledge of the grounds for avoidance. Art. 121. (3) Thedeclarant avoiding his declaration must compensate the other party for any dam-age the latter sustained by relying upon the validity of the declaration, not, how-
ever, beyond the value of the interest which the other had in the validity of the
declaration. Art. 12.
"Decisions, part i, i9-2o.
"Id., part I, ig. This is the general continental rule. German Civil Code, art.
123; Swiss law of Obligations, art. 28. See also Japanese Civil Code, art 96.
'Decisions, part i, I6.
COMMENTS
any act which has no causa or whose causa is illegal is invalid and
creates no obligation between the parties."'0
Causa would appear to be required, therefore, as a general principle
and may be dispensed with only in particular cases, for example, in the
case of negotiable instruments.1
Declarations of will through agents are governed also by continental
notions. Such declarations must be made in the principal's name if he
is to be bound directly.12 The doctrine of the undisclosed principal of
Anglo-American law is, therefore, not recognized as regards civil trans-
actions. In commercial matters, however, all acts within the scope of
the agent's authority are directly operative in favor of, as well as
against, the principal, although the latter's name was not disclosed; with
this qualification, that if the other party was ignorant of the fact that
the agent acted in a representative capacity, he may enforce the agree-
ment against the agent personally and refuse performance when claimed
by the principal.'8 The termination of an agent's power is inoperative
as against a bona fide third party and any juristic act performed before
such notice on behalf of the principal binds him.
In accordance with continental usage persons are divided into natural
and juristic persons, the latter being subdivided into associations and
foundations. Associations are corporations in the Anglo-American
sense, being either for profit or not for profit. Foundations take the
place of the English charitable trust, a corporation being created, but
without members or other specific persons who have rights as bene-
ficiaries. Although there are no statutory provisions in China relating to
foundations or associations other than trading companies and corpora-
tions of the public law, juristic persons are recognized by the Supreme
Court as natural products of society, existing in fact because of social
necessities. Countenance is thus given to the prevailing continental
theory that juristic persons are , "real" entities.1 5 Foreign associations,
however, are not recognized as juristic persons in China, it would
seem, although they may have been lawfully constituted as such at
home. If a company has a branch office in China the manager is per-
sonally responsible for all juristic acts which he may have performed,
in behalf of that company.'0
In matters of commercial law the Supreme Court has been to some
extent influenced by Anglo-American law. Continental law does not
authorize bills of exchange to be made payable to bearer, and promis-
sory notes can be made so payable only in countries adopting the French
theory concerning bills and ndtes. The Chinese Supreme Court fol-
lows the example 6f England, of the United States, and of Japan."
" Id., part i, A8. See Lorenzen, Causa, and Consideration in the Law of Con-
tracts (igig) 28 YALS LAw JouRN AT 621.
"Id., part 2, 30. "2Id., part i, 24.
=Id., part 2, 24. "Id., part 1, 25.
See Saleilles, De la personnaliti juridique (igio) 525 et seq.
"Decisions, part 2, 17-1$. 'Id., 2, 30.
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As one reads the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of China
during the brief period of seven years one marvels that such a change
from the old r~gime should have been possible. With one bound, as it
were, China has cut loose from the past and placed herself juridically
on a footing of equality with the most civilized countries of our day.
Those who had some familiarity with the provisions of the draft of
the Chinese Civil Code knew the lofty spirit in which that great work
was conceived, but were not without misgivings concerning the ability
of the Chinese judiciary to give practical effect to a foreign system of
law. The decisions of the Supreme Court just published go a long
way, however, in reassuring us in that regard. Apparently'the Chinese
mind as a result of long centuries of civilization and philosophic study
has acquired a nimbleness which enables its judges to apply with mas-
tery the rules of the new jus gentium. May we not hope, however,
that the legal structure to be erected will not be based exclusively upon
the principles of continental law, but that it will appropriate also the
good qualities of the Anglo-American legal system? May China be
far-sighted enough to send more of her youth to study law in England
and the United States, so that they may become acquainted with the
spirit of Anglo-American law. If our young sister republic should
succeed in blending the two great legal systems of the world-the
Roman-continental and the Anglo-American-it would make a contri-
bution to civilization, the effect of which can hardly be over-estimated.
For the present we are content to know that its Supreme Court has
already made a splendid beginning in the establishment of a new legal
order. E.G.L.
SPECIFIC CRIMINAL INTENT IN STATUTORY ASSAULTS
As is well known, all assaults at common law were misdemeanors,
and the fact that the assault was accompanied by an intent to commit a
particular felony did not change the grade of the offense, although such
aggravating circumstance might properly increase the severity of the
punishment imposed upon the misdemeanant. 1 By statute, however,
both in England and in the United States, the particular criminal intent
actuating the assailant frequently causes his offense to be distinct from
an assault delivered by one acting with a different intent. Thus in
Connecticut, for example, assault with intent to murder, assault with
intent to rob, striking with intent to maim or disfigure, and assault with
a dangerous weapon, are treated as distinct offenses for which distinct
punishments are prescribed.2 Where a specific criminal intent is made
12 Wharton, Criminal Law (ith ed.) sec. 838; 2 Bishop, New Criminal Law
(8th ed. 1892) secs. 42, 55; Commonwealth v. Bigelow (1808) 4 Mass. 438; Stout
v. Commonwealth (1824, Pa.) ii Serg. & R. 177; Sinmpson v. State (1877) 59
Ala. 1, 9.
'Conn. Rev. St. 1918, secs. 6193, 6199, 6194, 6344. This is only a partial list of
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an element of the statutory offense, the necessity of alleging such in-
tent in the indictment and of proving it upon the trial seems obvious
and is in general admitted without dispute.8
Questions of difficulty, however, sometimes arise when the victim of
the assault'is not the person whom the assailant really desired to injure.
This may happen either through a mistake of identity, as where A,
desiring to kill or maim B, mistakes C for B and under this misappre-
hension assaults C, or through accident, as where A shoots at B, but by
mistake of aim misses B and hits C. The distinction between mistake
of identity and mistake of aim has not always been observed in the de-
cided cases. To show its importance is the purpose of this discussion.
The problem involved in mistaken identity was recently presented to
the Supreme Court of Connecticut in State v. Costa (i92O, Conn.) no
Atl. 875. The information charged the defendant with assaulting C
with a razor, with intent to maim and disfigure him, contrary to the
statute.4 Evidence was offerred tending to prove that the defendant
had previously quarrelled with one W, that he mistook C for W, and,
acting under that misapprehension, came up behind C and slashed his
cheek with a razor. The defendant's counsel objected that evidence
of a purpose to maim W did not tend to prove the charge of assault with
intent to disfigure C. The court answered this contention convinc-
ingly, saying in effect, that although the attack was made under a mis-
take as to the identity of the victim, the defendant intentionally directed
his assault at C with intent to disfigure him, and thus his act fell
squarely within the statutory prohibition. 5 This analysis, it is sub-
mitted, is correct. In cases of mistaken identity there is no need of
invoking the doctrine of "transferred intent," as is sometimes done.,
The very person assaulted is the person intended to be maimed or killed,
statutory assaults. It should be noted that in such statutes the term "assault" is
frequently used to include a battery as well as a technical assault.
' 2 Wharton, op. cit. note i, sec. 839.
'Conn. Rev. St. 1918, sec. 6194: "Every person who shall put out an eye, slit
an ear, nose, lip, or any other part of the head, face, or neck of another, or cut or
bite off or disable any member of another, with intent to maim or disfigure him
. shall be imprisoned not more than ten years."
Mr. Justice Case's words were as follows (p. 877): "The information ac-
curately presented a charge which the evidence tended directly to substantiate.
It in no sense negatived or qualified the immediate purpose and legal intent of
Clark's assailant to afsault Clark that the act may have rested wholly upon a mis-
taken belief as to Clark's identity. The purpose of the assailant was to accomplish
the end immediately in view, and the actual victim was no less the intended direct
physical object of the attack because at the time he may have been taken for
someone else."
'For example, in People v'. Wells (i9o4) 145 Cal. 138, 140, 78 Pac. 470, 471,
Van Dyke, J. says: "But where one intends to assault or kill a certain person,
and by mistake or inadvertence, assaults or kills another in his stead, it is never-
theless a crime, and the intent is transferred from the party who was intended to
the other." See also i Wharton, op. cit. note i, at p. 184, note 3.
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for the defendant desires his blow to take effect upon the particular
person before him, although such desire is based upon a mistake of fact,
i. e., as to the identity of his victim. Such a mistake of fact is, of
course, immaterial and furnishes no excuse.7
But if the case involves an accidental blow from mistaken aim,
rather than an intended blow from mistaken identity, different consid-
erations are involved. Suppose, for example, the defendant had struck
at W, but his blow had been deflected and had fallen upon and slashed
the cheek of C. Could he be convicted of the statutory offense of as-
saulting C with intent to disfigure him? There are cases which imply
an affirmative answer," but it is believed that they are the result of
inadequate analysis. In such a case the consequences of the defendant's
act are clearly not such as he in fact intended. With respect to C, his
act was accidental, for his intent was to have it produce consequences
upon W. Now it is true that a person is sometimes held answerable,
even in criminal law, for the unintended consequences of his acts. If
an unlawful blow intended to kill W accidentally falls upon and kills
C, there is no doubt that the actor will be guilty of the murder or the
manslaughter of C.9  In such a case the general criminal intent to strike
one is "transferred from the party who was intended" to the actual
victim and gives criminal color to the unintended result of causing the
latter's death. This is because the criminal state of mind, which
coupled with the act causing death, constitutes murder or manslaugh-
ter, need not be a specific intent to kill the person whose death is
caused.10  "Malice" as used in the definition of murder is a technical
term and means no more than "a heart regardless of social duty, and
fatally bent on mischief.""'  This criminal state of mind exists in the
defendant -when he strikes an unlawful blow, and although the con-
sequences of theblow fall upon an unintended victim, there seems no
injustice in punishing him as if he had intended such consequences.
But where a statute requires one element of the offense to be a specific
intent with respect to the person assaulted, there is no place for such
"In accord with the principal case, see Queen v. Lynch (1846, Cent Cr. Ct>
I Cox C. C. 361; Regina. zt Stopford (187o, N. P.) ii Cox C. C. 643; Regina v.
Smith (i853, Cr. Cas. Res.) Dears. C. C. 559 ("the prisoner . . . meant to mtrder
the man at whom he shot"); People v. Torres (i869) 38 CaL 141; McGehee v.
State (1885) 62 Miss. 772 ("The evil and specific intent to strike the form before
him at the time is manifest.").
See State v. Gilman (879) 69 Me. z63; Callahan v. State (1871) -1 Oh. St..
306; Rex v. Jarvis (1837, N. P.) 2 Moody & R. 40; Dunaway v. People (1884)
110 II1. 333; cf. People v. Stoyan (1917) 280 Ill. 300, 17 N. E. 464.
'3 Wharton op. cit. note i, sec. 441. Wharton notes certain logical difficulties
with this doctrine, but recognizes that it is established beyond question. Numer-
ous cases are collected in go Am. St Rep. 582, note.
'0 The rule of pleading should be noted, however, that the indictment must
allege the assault to have been made upon the person killed. State v. Clark
(88) 147 Mo. 20, 47 S. W. 886.
'Pennsylvania v. Honeyman (1793, Pa.) Add. 147.
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doctrine of "transferred intent." The intent to kill or injure another
than the one assaulted is not the intent required by statute. The dis-
tinctipn in this respect between cases of murder and of statutory as-
saults has been well pointed out.
1 2
Of course a statute may be so framed that the wounding of one per-
son coupled with an intent to wound another constitutes the statutory
offense.3 And it would seem the part of wise legislation so to phrase
the statutes as to provide for such cases, for clearly the moral guilt of
the assailant is as great when his blow accidentally falls upon a third
party as when it reaches the intended victim. But usually the statutes
are so worded that a conviction for assault with a specific intent
against the injured person cannot be sustained where it appears that
the assailant's blow was in fact intended for another.1" A few cases
appear to be contrary to this view ;15 but it is believed that the weight
of authority as well as the better reasoning sustains the propositions
asserted above. It should be noted also that even though the assailant
cannot be convicted of the aggravated statutory assault upon the per-
son injured he may be held guilty of a simple assault or battery,0
for these crimes do not require a specific intent with respect to the
injured person. T.W.S.
'State v. Mulhall (i9o6) I99 Mo. 202, 218, 97 S. W. 583, 587 and cases therein
cited; cf. State v. Gilman and Dunaway v. People, supra note 8.
1324 & 25 Vict. (186i) c. ioo, sec i8: "Whosoever shall unlawfully and malici-
ously by any means whatever wound . . . any person. . . with intent to maim,
disfigure, or disable any person . . . shall be guilty of felony." It is stated in
Regina v. Latimer (I886, Cr. Cas. Res.) 16 Cox C. C. 70, that this section was in
substitution for and correction of the earlier statute of 9 Geo. IV c. 31, under
which it was necessary that the intent should be an intent to injure the person
actually injured. See Re_- v. Holt (x836, N. P.) 7 Car. & P. 518. Mo. Rev. St
1909, sec. 4483 accomplishes the same result.
In State v. Thomas (igio) 127 La. 576, 53 So. 868, 37 L. R. A. (N. s.) 172 a
statute reading: "Whoever shall shoot any person with a dangerous weapon
with intent to commit murder, shall etc." was construed as not requiring the
intent to murder to have been directed against the person actually hit. See also
Wareham v. State (1874) 25 Oh. St. 6oi. Perhaps Dunaway v. People, supra
note 8, is also explainable on the ground of statutory construction.
"A large number of authorities are collected in State v. Muihall, supra note 12;
see also People v. Stoyan., supra note 8.
' See cases cited in note 8. In Callahan v. State (i871) 21 Oh. St 3o6, 309, the
court says: "Criminal intent may be properly asserted of an injury by malicious
shooting . . . where a shot discharged at one injures another who is at the time
known to be in such position or proximity that his injury may be reasonably
apprehended as a probable consequence of the act; in which case the law does
not permit such reckless disregard of, and indifference to, results to pass with im-
punity, but will hold the intent to have embraced the victim." Perhaps on the
ground that injury to the person in fact injured was a probable consequence of
shooting at the intended victim, these cases may be distinguished from cases
where the injury to the third party is purely accidental.
'Regina v. Latimer (1886, Cr. Cas. Res.) i6 Cox C. C. 70; Simpson v. State
(1877) 5g Ala. 1, 9; Cowley v. State (1882, Tenn.) io Lea., 282.
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Common scolds were indictable at common law' and when convicted,
were properly ducked,2 but the husband was denied the privilege of
suing his louder half.3 Iri spite of recent married women's property
acts, ostensibly giying a wife her antenuptial legal status,4 the courts
are slow to allow either husband or wife to sue the other for torts.5
The supreme court of Minnesota has refused to enjoin a wife's nag-
ging. Drake v. Drake (1920, Minn) 1:77 N. W. 624. He could have
sued her for a broken promise, but not for a broken ear drum.6 And
the Weight of Authority sustains the decision. 7 Nag on, Xanthippe.
What do we mean by "permanent," and how long is "forever"? If
land is conveyed to a railroad company "in consideration of the per-
manent location of the depot" thereon, to be used "exclusively for a
depot," with a street, "which is forever to remain open," does title
revert to the grantor's heirs when the land is no longer used for a
depot or a street 65 years later? In Sheets v. Vandalia Ry. (1920,
Ind. App.) 127 N. E. 6o9, the court held that it does not. The court
first held that the words created a condition and not a covenant; that is,
that failure to use the land for a depot and street is a fact that operates
as a condition subsequent to the vesting of title in the company and
not merely as a breach of a legal duty. The occurrence of this fact,
therefore, terminates the title of the grantee. The court then further
held that this fact did not occur and that the provisions of the deed
were substantially complied with. Thus it seems superficially that 65
years constitutes permanency in the case of a depot and "forever" in
the case of a street. It may be admitted, however, that "permanent
location of a depot" may mean the location of a permanent depot and
that a "permanent depot" is any depot building firmly attached to the
soil. On this theory a very few months' use of the land for depot
purposes might satisfy the provisions of the deed.
14 Blackstone, Commentaries, 168.
2Ibid.
ai Blackstone, Commentaries, 443. But see 8 Hooker, Lawes of Ecclesiastical
Politie (1676) 2, "The law appointeth no man to be an husband, but if a man
hath betaken himself unto that condition, it giveth him then authority over his
own Wife."
'Married Women's Act, Minn. Gen. St. 1913, sec. 7,42; (,920) 29 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 454; Prosser v. Prosser (I92O, S. C.) lO2 S. 1. 787.
' (1918) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, io8i; Heyman v. Heyman (97) 1g Ga. App.
634, 92 S. E. 25.
'See "Brown v. Brown (1914) 88 Conn. 42, 46, 89 Atl. 889, 8gi.TDishon's Adm'r. v. Dishon's Adm'r. (192o, Ky.) 219 S. W. 794, has collection
of authorities; Keister's Adm'r. v. Keister's Ex'rs. (igi8) 123 Va. 157, 96 S. E.
315.
